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Abstract
This essay expands upon an earlier work (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005) in which we
analyzed the implications of the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis
concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay we
revisit some of the concerns surrounding this case by analyzing the intellectual property
and privacy issues that emerged in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case. These two cases
illustrate some of the key tensions that exist between privacy and property interests in
cyberspace. In our analysis, we contrast Digital Rights Management (DRM) and
Interoperability and we examine some newer distribution models of sharing over P2P
networks. We also analyze some privacy implications in the two cases in light of the
theory of privacy as contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004).
1. Introduction
This essay9 expands upon an earlier work (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005) in which we
analyzed the implications of the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis
concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay, we
analyze some implications for intellectual property by drawing some analogies to the
ruling in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case, which demonstrates that the debate over
sharing copyrighted material in P2P systems has not been limited to copyrighted music
files. In particular, we question whether the Verizon and Grokster cases advance the
interests of copyright owners at the expense of preserving privacy for individual users.
We also question whether the rulings in these two cases threaten new technologies in
order to advance the interest of copyright owners. We then examine some privacy
implications surrounding these cases in light of the theory of privacy as contextual
integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004). Although we disagree with the tactics used by the
recording and movie industries to track down individuals who download unauthorized
proprietary content from the Internet, we do not defend copyright violation. However, we
also believe that some alternative strategies need to be examined in this debate.

9

An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 11th International Conference on the Social and
Ethical Impacts of Information and Communications Technologies, University of Mantua, Italy, September
2008, and printed in the ETHICOMP 2008 Conference Proceedings, 2008, pp. 373-383.
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A Brief Review of the Verizon v. RIAA and the MGM v. Grokster Cases:
Implications for the Future of P2P Systems
We begin by providing some background information in the Verizon and MGM cases,
including the timeline in each. In January 2003, U.S. District Court in Washington D.C.
ruled that Verizon must comply with the subpoena issued by the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) requesting the name of a subscriber who allegedly made
available more than 600 copyrighted music files over the Internet. Subpoena power
applies to all Internet service providers within the scope of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), not just to those service providers storing information on a
system or network at the direction of a user. On December 19, 2003 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the lower court’s decision
alleging that the DMCA applied only to those sites hosting illegal content and not to
those simply transmitting it.
2.

The debate over sharing copyrighted material in P2P systems has not been limited to
copyrighted music files (e.g., as argued in the Verizon case). The motion picture industry
has also been concerned about the ease with which copyrighted movies can be freely
exchanged in file-sharing systems. In 2003, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) sued two
P2P file-sharing services, alleging that over 90% of the material exchanged on Grokster
was copyrighted material and that the P2P service was legally liable. The lower district
court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Grokster could not be held liable for the
distribution of copyrighted material because: it lacked sufficient knowledge of the
infringement; it did not materially contribute to the copyright infringement. MGM
appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. During the oral arguments, the justices
seemed to be divided between two principles: the need to "protect new technologies"
(such as P2P networks) and the need to provide "remedies against copyright
infringement.” The Court unanimously confirmed that using Grokster's service to trade
copyrighted material is illegal (but the Court did not agree that P2P technology should be
made illegal). This decision reflected the tension to protect new technologies as well as
copyright holders.
What are some of the implications of the Court’s decisions in these two cases for the
future of P2P technology? Whereas the appeals process in the Verizon case can arguably
be interpreted as favoring the privacy rights of individual users in P2P networks, we
believe that the US Supreme Court in the MGM appeals tended to side with property
right holders. However, the Court’s ruling does not necessarily threaten innovative
technologies such as P2P systems, despite the efforts of some property right holders to
eliminate P2P systems altogether.
The Verizon and MGM cases illustrate ethical challenges that affect both privacy and
property. The conflict between privacy and property rights in cyberspace can be
understood as a tension involving “access and control” (Tavani, 2004). Whereas
property-rights advocates argue for greater control over information they view to be
proprietary (thereby restricting access to that information by ordinary persons), privacy
advocates argue for individuals having greater control over their own personal
information (thus restricting access to that information by entrepreneurs). In the next
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section of this essay, we examine some property-related issues affecting the two cases.
Privacy-related concerns are examined in Section 4.
3. Property-Related Issues Affecting the Verizon and MGM Cases
In an earlier essay (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005), we discussed Jessica Litman’s
concern that the extension to the Copyright Act of 1976 has contributed to the shrinking
of the public domain by extending the scope of copyright to anything that is potentially
copyrightable. Litman (2003) offers up a distribution model whereby the default is to
share and therefore expand the public domain. Since then several other distribution
models have emerged that concern online file sharing.
3.1 Distribution Models
By the year 2012, it is estimated that 40% of the global music market will be digital
music (Evans, 2008). If more than 60 million users are sharing music over the Internet,
and if many composers are not getting compensated adequately, then a fair distribution
model that balances copyright with contextual privacy would be desirable. In an attempt
to address some current inequities affecting copyright, a cluster of distribution models
based on subscription fees have emerged since the publication of our last paper. In
particular, many of these models are directed at servicing online music stores and
portable MP3 players. The most popular of these models, iTunes is compatible with the
iPod, Apple’s MP3 player. On Demand Distribution (OD2) is another distribution model
that is popular in Europe. Nokia purchased it in 2006 for use on mobile phones.
Streaming media is yet another distribution model and is found in Internet radio.
3.1.1 The iTunes model
In the iTunes online music store, users are now downloading one and a quarter million
songs per day, which is an annual run rate of almost half a billion songs per year. The
contract that iTunes users sign in order to download their music strictly describes what
they can or cannot do with the songs that they download. As for now, the proprietary
nature of Apple software prevents downloading onto other portable devices; the
distribution model is limited to iPods. However, iPods do play open format CD’s not
purchased from iTunes. This raises concerns about a possible “distribution monopoly.”10
Apple has implemented a technology known as Fair Play DRM in an effort to stop illegal
file sharing activities, and this technology is now active on all but the EMI music catalog.
On April 3, 2007, EMI, one of the big four announced that it would sell its music without
DRM on the iTunes music store. Non-DRM formatted music will cost slightly more than
the $0.99 cents DRM version. This move will pave the way for others to follow suit
(Felton, 2007). There will be no great loss for the big four: EMI, Sony BMG, Universal
and Warner, as less than 3% of all music played on iPods is purchased from iTunes, and
therefore, protected with DRM (Jobs, 2007). More than 90% of music is sold DRM free.

10

The issue of a “distribution monopoly” is beyond the scope of this essay. However, we should point out
that Apple worries that if it opens up its DRM (Digital Rights Management) algorithm to others, it would
lose the ability to protect its music, which would cause it to lose its distribution rights. (DRM, and some
controversies surrounding it, are briefly examined in Section 3.2 of this essay.)
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Steve Jobs believes that if DRM restrictions were lifted, there might be an influx of new
stores and players. (Jobs, 2007)
3.1.2 On Demand Distribution
At one time, OD2 was the primary download technology for online music stores in
Europe. The European community is now looking at distribution models that work on
standards that anyone could license, and so they are opposed to the monopolistic
approach of Apple. Yet they are no longer satisfied with OD2 because of the
interoperability problems that model has had. As noted above, Nokia purchased OD2 in
2006 in order to use it on its mobile phones. It is unclear, however, whether Nokia
support will bring OD2 back as a serious contender in the digital music arena in Europe
(Finlayson, 2006). Also, we should note that if Microsoft launches its own portable
digital player, this product would have the potential to compete with Apple. No one has
yet solved the interoperability issue, as online music stores typically service their own
hardware.
3.1.3 Streaming Media
Video and audio streaming each have their own set of problems (whose details go beyond
the scope of this essay). In video format, user-created content can be developed and used,
but any content that is copyrighted can only be used with permission of the copyright
holder. Who owns the copyright? Often there are several layers of “middlemen.” We
believe that Lessig’s Creative Commons (CC) License would be helpful, if the goal is to
broaden the public domain and make sharing easier.
The current growth rate for Internet radio is 27% per year, as compared to the 1% annual
growth rate for traditional radio (Siglin, 2007). Internet radio stations that use audio
streaming have been under attack by the Library of Congress Royalty Board, who issues
royalty fees and who have been trying to revise the fee structure retroactive to 2006
(Siglin, 2007). How would this affect Internet Radio? “AOL Radio, LaunchCast,
ClearChannel and Live365 would be billed $363 million during the same year that all
14,000 US radio stations combined would be billed $550 million” (Siglin, 2007). The
tension between the Royalty Board and Internet radio was created in part by Sound
Exchange, representatives of the record companies who “…sought the royalty amid a
drop in compact disc sales that fell 20% from 2004-2006”(Tirrell, 2007).
It would seem that the case audio streaming can be viewed as one more instance in which
proprietary interests are shrinking the public domain and thwarting new technologies
from further development. Yahoo and AOL may have to shut down their Internet radio
stations. In an attempt to nullify the ruling of the Copyright Royalty Board, the Internet
Radio Equality Act was proposed in the Senate in May 2007.
3.2 Privately Preserving Property: DRM Vs. Interoperability
Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology can be defined as “Technology that
protects a piece of intellectual digital property such as a music, video, or text file. With
DRM, copyrighted material downloaded from the Web may be restricted so that it cannot
be freely distributed” (http://h71036.www7.hp.com/hho/cache/281-0-0-225-121.html).
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Because DRM builds a “digital fence” around a piece of copyrighted content, and allows
only certain authorized access or use, it can be viewed as posing a significant obstacle to
online file sharing. In the US, according to the DMCA, it is illegal to circumvent this
technology for any reason; so the user has no legal recourse except to abandon his/her
attempt to use the protected content. Current DRM schemes tip the balance in favor of
the copyright owner who can determine how and by whom his/her content may be used.
For that reason, DRM has become an obstacle to private use because it limits the user’s
freedom, by allowing private interests to define the parameters of the law. For users in
DRM systems to preserve their fair use rights, they must be able to access material
anonymously and to use content without authorization or demand for compensation
(Armstrong, 2006). For more on issues affecting private use as “fair use”, see
Grodzinsky and Bottis (2007).
In the context of online music sharing, there is a tension between DRM and
interoperability. Interoperability enables users to download and play music on a variety
of devices. This ability also challenges the notion that downloadable content can and
should be restricted to proprietary devices controlled by the company that owns the
online store. France is perceived to have led the way in interoperability when in March,
2006 its National Assembly passed a law that would force distributors of online music in
France to remove DRM so that music can be played on any device. Any company using
proprietary music formats would be affected by this law, which may pave the way for
other EU countries to follow (Hesseldahl, 2006). However, many distributors of music
content believe that legally pushing interoperability will result in opening the door to file
sharing of copyrighted material without compensation.
It is encouraging that EMI has agreed to distribute non-DRM music on the iTunes
platform. On the one hand, opening up the distribution of music online might encourage
other subscription services to follow suit. On the other hand, while these developments
can be viewed as attempts to move in the right direction, unfortunately, the fair
distribution of media might reduce but not totally eliminate unauthorized online file
sharing of proprietary music. However, we do not subscribe to the recent attempts by
the RIAA at lawsuits and lobbying in Congress for bills that tie penalties to online file
sharing, especially those schemes that do so at the expense of personal privacy.
4. Context Based Theories of Privacy
In our earlier essay (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005), we described some of the difficulties
one encounters when attempting to give a precise definition of privacy. There, we also
distinguished between descriptive privacy and normative privacy, and we differentiated
among three types of privacy: accessibility privacy, decisional privacy, and informational
privacy. In our analysis of the Verizon case we also defended a theory of privacy
advanced by Moor (1990, 1997) and expanded upon by Tavani and Moor (2001). Key
aspects of this privacy framework, which we refer to as the RALC (Restricted
Access/Limited Control) theory of privacy, are more fully explicated in Tavani (2007,
2008). So, we will not repeat the details of RALC here. However, we should note that
one virtue of RALC that is crucial for our discussion of privacy in the present essay is
that it is a context-based privacy theory that appeals to the notion of a “situation” in
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determining whether a particular context, such as a P2P network, warrants normative
privacy protection.
4.1 Privacy as Contextual Integrity
We have already noted how the RALC theory was helpful in analyzing P2P networks
used in the Verizon case from the perspective of normative privacy protection. In this
section, we show how a context-based theory of privacy such as Helen Nissenbaum’s
“contextual integrity” theory can also help us to understand the issues at stake for
individual privacy in the debate about P2P environments.11 We should note at the outset
that Nissenbaum describes her privacy framework as a “benchmark theory,” rather than a
full-fledged theory of privacy (Nissenbaum 2004). However, we believe that her
framework is sufficiently developed to inform the privacy debate in cases such as
Verizon and MGM. How, exactly, does her privacy theory enable us to do this? First, we
should note that Nissenbaum’s theory requires that the processes used in gathering and
disseminating information are “appropriate to a particular context” and that they comply
with the “governing norms of distribution” for that context (Nissenbaum, 101). This
insight expands upon her earlier work on the problem of “privacy in public”
(Nissenbaum, 1997, 1998), where she notes that normative privacy protection does not
typically apply to personal information gathered about us in what she describes as the
“public sphere.” For example, she points out that privacy norms (whether in the form of
explicit privacy laws or informal privacy policies) protect personal information
considered to be intimate and sensitive. This generally includes personal information
such as medical records and financial records. However, normative privacy protection
does not generally extend to personal information about us that can be gathered from our
activities in public places – e.g., places where we shop, dine, recreate, and so forth.
Some of the core concerns affecting the problem of privacy in public, introduced in
Nissenbaum’s earlier essays, are also illustrated in her theory of privacy as contextual
integrity (Nissenbaum 2004). Two key principles underlying Nissenbaum’s later privacy
theory are:
(i) the activities people engage in take place in a “plurality of realms” (i.e.,
spheres or contexts)
(ii) each realm has a distinct set of norms that govern its aspects.
These principles or norms both shape and limit or restrict our roles, behavior, and
expectations by governing the flow of personal information in a given context.12
Additionally, Nissenbaum (2004) distinguishes between two types of informational
norms: (a) norms of appropriateness, and (b) norms of distribution. The first of these
determines whether a given type of personal information is either appropriate or
inappropriate to divulge within a particular context. According to Nissenbaum, (138),
these norms “circumscribe the type or nature of information about various individuals
11

My description of Nissenbaum’s privacy theory in this section closely parallels my accounts in Tavani
(2008, in press).
12
The contextual integrity model proceeds on the assumption that there are “no areas of life are not
governed by norms of information flow” (Nissenbaum 2004, 137).
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that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed.”
Contrast these norms with those of distribution, which restrict the flow of information
within and across contexts. Nissenbaum (125) believes that when either of these norms is
“breached,” a violation of privacy occurs. On the contrary, the contextual integrity of the
flow of personal information is maintained when both kinds of norms are “respected.” 13
Nissenbaum argues that her contextual integrity theory improves upon the leading
alternative privacy theories in at least two key respects. For one thing, she notes that
personal information that is revealed or disclosed in a particular context is always
“tagged” with that context and thus is never “up for grabs.” Because alternative privacy
theories lack the appropriate “mechanisms” to prevent the “anything goes” approach to
this kind of personal information, 14 Nissenbaum believes that those theories cannot grant
normative protection to the kinds of personal information gathered in public places, A
second key respect in which her theory differs from alternative accounts can be found in
her claim that the “scope of informational norms” is always “internal to a given context”
– i.e., the norms are “relative” or “non-universal” (Nissenbaum 125). She also points out
that in her theory, “context-relative qualifications” can be “built right into the
informational norms” of any given context, unlike other normative theories of privacy
where these qualifications tend to be treated as “exceptions or tradeoffs” (Nissenbaum,
138).15
As in the case of the RALC framework mentioned above, Nissenbaum’s theory illustrates
why we must always attend to the context in which information flows, not the nature of
the information itself, in determining whether normative protection is needed.16 Like
RALC, Nissenbaum’s framework of privacy as contextual integrity can be applied to a
wide range of contemporary technologies to determine whether they breach the
informational privacy norms that govern specific contexts.17
13

Nissenbaum argues that there are no information or spheres of life for which “anything goes.” As
Nissenbaum (2004, 128) states: “Almost everything – things that we do, events that occur, transactions that
take place – happens in a context…” In her scheme, contexts include “spheres of life” such as education,
politics, the marketplace, and so forth.
14
Nissenbaum (1998) points out that when it comes to questions about how to protect personal information
in public contexts, or in what she calls “spheres other than the intimate,” most normative accounts of
privacy have a theoretical “blind spot.”
15
In this sense, she believes that her theory allows for the possibility of “context-relative variation” as an
“integral part of contextual integrity.”
16
Rather than focusing on the nature of the information included in a P2P situation – i.e., asking whether or
not it should be viewed as private – we can ask whether P2P situations or contexts (in general) deserve
protection as “normatively private situations” (Moor) or contexts (Nissenbaum). In the RALC framework,
Moor (1997) includes a scenario involving information about faculty salaries for professors who teach at
public institutions funded by tax-payers vs. small, privately owned colleges, to illustrate this point. He
notes that there is nothing inherent in the information about the professors’ salaries per se that is helpful in
determining whether it was appropriate to protect that information. Instead, Moor argues that it is the
specific “situation” or context – in particular, the norms governing the flow of information in the context of
a large public university vs. a small private college – that determined whether it is appropriate to grant such
information normative protection.
17
For example, Nissenbaum’s account of the problem of privacy in public, in conjunction with her
framework of contextual integrity, can help us to better understand the kinds of privacy threats posed by
data-mining technology (Tavani, 2007). For an interesting discussion of how Nissenbaum’s theory of
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5. Extending Contextual Integrity To P2P Contexts
How can Nissenbaum’s account of privacy as contextual integrity be applied to P2P
contexts? Before attempting to extend the theory of Contextual Integrity to P2P
networks, we first respond to the challenge of whether a P2P environment can count as a
context.18 For example, some might object that P2P networks lack explicit norms for
governing the behavior of its participants and thus might not qualify as a conventional
“context” – at least not in a normative sense. Against such an objection, we note that P2P
environments have implicit rules that govern the behavior of participants as well as
explicit privacy policies in some cases. But consider that even in the absence of explicit
rules governing all of our day-to-day activities, many of our cultural norms (in general)
are based upon adherence to implicit rather than explicit rules. So, for our purposes, we
can assume that a P2P network is an example of a context that is governed by rules.
We believe that Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity shows why it is
inappropriate for the RIAA to have access to personal information that belongs to a P2P
context. For one thing, P2P users have an expectation of privacy based in part on the
privacy policies and the distributed architectures (e.g. Bit Torrent) that were created, in
part, to preserve the anonymity of the clients. According to the norms of appropriateness,
IP addresses that enable file sharing among clients are appropriate to those involved in
the sharing process. In some highly distributed models, these address strings are further
randomized to preserve anonymity, even among those sharing files. According to the
norms of distribution, email accounts as well as upgrades about P2P services are
available to those who choose to create accounts and subscribe to the services; these are
used solely within the P2P service and are not shared with third parties. Privacy policies
on the Morpheus and Bit Torrent Web sites outline the terms of distribution of personal
information. Following the Napster, Grokster and Verizon cases, some “context-relevant
qualifications” have emerged on these sites. For example, Bit Torrent’s policy says,
Notwithstanding any other term of this Privacy Policy, we may release any
personal information we obtain or collect when we believe its release is
appropriate to comply with the law, enforce our Site policies, or protect ours or
others' rights, property, or safety (http://www.bittorrent.com/privacy?csrc=splash).
Morpheus, distributed by StreamCast Networks, makes a similar claim, when it asserts:
StreamCast does not condone copyright, patent or other intellectual property
infringement. Due to the nature of peer-to-peer software, StreamCast Networks is
unable to monitor or control the files searched for or shared using Morpheus. If
you locate any material being shared by a user who you believe may be in violation
of copyright or other intellectual property law, please report your concerns to that
user directly. This is not intended to be legal advice or counsel. If you have any
questions consult your attorney.

contextual integrity can be applied to privacy issues involving “vehicle-safety communications
technologies,” see Zimmer (2005).
18
For example, Richard Volkman has posed this question to us in a conversation about “P2P contexts.”
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This approach preserves the flow of distribution and does not assume the role of cyber
police. The next part of the policy defines its “context-relevant” qualifications.
Morpheus® values your anonymity and privacy. Morpheus does not contain or
bundle malicious spyware. Upon being served with valid subpoenas or warrants,
Morpheus will cooperate with governmental agencies to eliminate and prosecute
trafficking
in
child
pornography
and
other
similar
crimes
(http://www.morpheus.com/notices.asp).
So while many of these P2P systems claim that they condemn sharing of copyrighted
material, and while they say that they will cooperate with legitimate legal actions, (not
requests of the entertainment industry), only Morpheus specifies that crimes on the level
of child pornography will cause it to alter its norm of distribution.
Because the RIAA has been technologically thwarted in its attempt to obtain information
about users from P2P networks directly, it has tried to get that information by other
means. Typically, file sharers connect to P2P networks through either their ISP’s or their
university’s networks. These two discrete contexts connect to the P2P context; however,
there is also information that crosses contexts (i.e., flows from one to the other). We
have argued elsewhere (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005) that the RIAA seems to assume
that its property interests automatically trump the privacy rights of P2P users. By
threatening ISP’s and universities with legal action, the RIAA hopes to obtain private
information that can be used to identify file sharers on the P2P networks. We believe that
this kind of behavior is a violation of privacy according to Nissenbaum’s theory.19
To see how the privacy violation occurs, consider the following scheme. In most
universities in the United States, student privacy is protected. There are explicit policies
in place that inform who may or may not have access to a student’s personal information.
In fact, on many campuses, parents may not have access to his or her child’s grades or to
information about the child’s professors without explicit consent from the student. So,
the flow of information within the university context is quite restricted. Consider that
university networks are part of the university context – i.e., they are owned and operated
by the university and, we believe, fall under their privacy rules. When students use the
university network to connect to a P2P network to file share, they move from a private
network to an openly distributed one, thus crossing contexts. The RIAA’s inability to
control file sharing through technology within the P2P’s has led it to increase its attempts
to force universities as well as ISP’s to assume the role of cyber police effectively,
placing the burden of enforcement on the university. This usually conflicts with the
university’s existing privacy policies. Thus, we believe that capitulation by the
universities and ISP’s based on threats from private industry would constitute a clear
violation of privacy, according to Nissenbaum’s theory.
In a more expansive and systematic attempt to control downloading on university
campuses, the RIAA has recently tried to tie the unauthorized downloading of files by
19

For a view that is more sympathetic to Verizon in this dispute, see Spinello (2004). We should also point
out that Spinello (2008) supports a position that is more sympathetic to MGM than the one we defend in
this essay.
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students to a loss of financial aid. Legislation introduced in November 2007 to amend
and extend the Higher Education Bill of 1965 includes the controversial Section 494,
entitled Campus-based digital theft prevention. Sunny Kalara, an intellectual property
attorney, explains, “Each eligible institution participating in the federal aid program shall:
provide annual disclosure/warnings to the students applying for or receiving financial aid,
stating that: P2P file sharing may subject them to civil and criminal liability” (Kalara,
2007). Students applying for or receiving financial aid, stating that: P2P file sharing may
subject them to civil and criminal liability” (Kalara, 2007). The bill demands that the
universities offer subscription services to their student bodies that will give them an
alternative to illegal file sharing. The American Association of Universities has written
to the proponents of the bill expressing their outrage and asking them to remove the P2P
section. Otherwise, innocent students could be caught up in a sweep that would penalize
them and deprive them of much needed financial aid, if universities do not comply.
6. Concluding Remarks
If we accept Nissenbaum’s context-based approach to privacy controversies affecting
P2P networks, in conjunction with one or more of the distribution models, that we
examined, we can both protect privacy interests of individuals and help ensure that
property owners’ interests are also reasonably preserved. Following DeCew (1997), we
believe in a “presumption in favor of privacy” as the default starting position in debates
affecting privacy and other interests, such as property. We also argue that P2P networks
are contextually private situations and, as such, protecting privacy in the debate involving
Verizon and the RIAA is essential. In the MGM case, we believe that the Courts failed to
appreciate the contextual aspect of P2P systems in its ruling. Even though the Court
upheld the legitimacy of P2P systems and their importance to technological innovation,
the majority opinion expressed by the Court did not recognize the significant implications
its decision had for the privacy of users of P2P systems. We believe that if the US
Supreme Court, in deciding the MGM case, had taken into consideration the contextual
nature of P2P networks and the kind of privacy protection that is warranted by such
contexts, the Court may have reached a different conclusion.
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